This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power at the regional level. Firstly, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an "income effect" which disincentivises the efforts of the regional tax administration. Secondly, these efforts tend to be lower in those electoral districts where vote turnout is high, the margin to lose a parliamentary seat is narrow and their parliamentary representation is high, although the importance of these disincentives decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent. Finally, leftist governments, through the tax administration, tend to exert a greater effort in ensuring tax compliance.
Introduction
There is no consensus in the relatively scarce literature on public finance and tax administration about how the objective function of a tax administration should be characterised (see Shoup, 1969; or, for a recent review, Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000) . The most common approach considers it to be a public agency that attempts to maximise the amount of gross tax revenue collected.
1 However, some empirical papers have shown that its efforts are also guided by electoral concerns (Hunter and Nelson, 1995; Young, Reksulak and Shughart, 2001) and, in the case of sub-central tax administrations, conditioned by the system of unconditional grants (Jha et al., 1999; Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau, 2002) . This paper aims to test several hypotheses concerning the determinants of the activities of the Spanish regional tax administration, in contrast to previous papers that have only tested one connection at a time.
First, we check whether the tax administration and the public budget are connected, or whether the former is simply a "black box" that-irrespective of the "health" of public finances, which are under the control of politicians (i.e., the Finance Ministry)-aims to obtain as much tax revenue as possible. Thus, for example, we test whether the tax administration exerts a greater (lower) effort in collecting taxes when the (expected) public deficit is greater (lower). In this sense, the spirit of our analysis is close to Toma and Toma's (1986) framework, in which "once this structure [the tax rates] has been established [in the legislative arena], a separate government body, the treasury, will devote resources toward the collection of revenue. The question of relevance then becomes how treasury bureaucrats will vary their collection activity in response to changes in the legislative determined tax rate" (pp. 141-142). However, in their paper, the reaction is caused by the variation in statutory tax parameters, while we consider any source of budgetary shock (e.g., an increase in the cost or the demand of public goods); additionally, they consider that the influence of politicians on bureaucrats is only due to an appropriation process by the latter, while we suppose that politicians condition the tasks of the tax administrators in order to gain electoral support, as we argue next.
Second, we analyse whether those efforts depend on electoral competition in each electoral district (or province).
2 According to this hypothesis, as long as the regional governing party aims at maximising the number of parliamentary seats, and taxpayers dislike paying taxes, we expect to see less effort in those electoral districts where there are more swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987) (2003) among US counties. Certainly, all these studies show the importance of electoral motives for the design of public policies, though the measurement of electoral competition differs in each case according to the way in which regional representatives are elected to the national assembly.
The empirical validation of either of these two hypotheses (budgetary connection and electoral competition) would confirm the connection between the tax administration and the political power, 3 though each one of them embodies totally different normative implications. In the first case, the tax administration becomes an extra tax instrument for the government, and can be used in order to obtain additional tax revenues (and so meet the constituency expenditure needs); therefore, it must increase the overall efficiency of the tax system (Slemrod, 1990) . In the second case, however, there would be less overall efficiency (and inter-provincial equity), since the efforts of the tax administration are simply guided by electoral motives.
These hypotheses are tested through an empirical analysis based on the estimation of stochastic frontiers (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) , and a frontier function is obtained from the estimation of a tax revenue function. The fact that certain observations lie below the frontier may be due either to an estimation error or to inefficiency on the part of the tax administration (i.e., less effort in tax collection). This technique permits to disentangle both effects, and consistently identifying which factors explain the distance of each decision unit to the frontier (what is known as the inefficiency effects model). In particular, we will apply the methodology of stochastic frontiers developed by Battese and Coelli (1995) to a panel of data, which has already
